Re-examining the Historical Records to Reaffirm the Disaster’s Root Causes

Dedication
This article is humbly dedicated to the families, relatives, and friends of the 134 Sailors killed and 167 severely wounded on July 29, 1967 aboard the USS Forrestal. We honor the hundreds of additional survivors who suffered from a lifetime of PTSD and “survivor’s guilt.” The bravery and heroics of the Sailors who saved the USS Forrestal and its 5,400 lives by quenching the fire and preventing the carrier from capsizing cannot possibly be overstated.

In 1967, while on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, the United States Navy Carrier USS Forrestal was executing wartime missions over North Vietnam. At 10:45 am local time, the ship was preparing to launch more than 27 A-4 Skyhawk and F-4B Phantom Fighter jets, all fully fueled and armed with a mixture of iron bombs, precision missiles, and Zuni rocket launchers. At 10:51 am, an F-4B experienced an un-commanded Zuni missile launch on the flight deck, striking a neighboring A-4 and starting a fire, causing a series of devastating secondary explosions. Quenching the fire nearly capsizes the ship, which is ultimately saved through the heroics of the sailors who served aboard the Forrestal.

Although the US Navy conducted an extremely thorough accident investigation, many subsequent technical articles in the aerospace and NASA literature, including current EMI design books, blame the initiation event on EMI from the onboard AN/SPS-43 VHF search radar. This article is aimed at reinforcing the official USN record regarding the accident’s true root cause. The Forrestal’s many “lessons learned” led in part to the creation of an entirely new discipline called “insensitive munitions” within the Electromagnetic Compatibility community and is therefore a critical event to understand.

In the February 2025 issue of In Compliance Magazine, Part 1 of this article laid the critical groundwork to describe how the US Navy conducted peacetime and wartime carrier operations in 1967 during the Vietnam War. Combat carriers were stationed 60 miles off the coast of North Vietnam in the Bay of Tonkin at a location named “Yankee Station.” The supercarrier USS Forrestal (CVA‑59) had transited from Norfolk, Virginia to Yankee Station, arriving on July 25, 1967. In Part 1, we presented the fateful events preceding the launch of the planned 1100-hour-long strike mission on July 29, 1967. We described how air operations were conducted, what equipment was used, what the deck personnel were doing, and some fateful decisions made in the days and moments leading up to the event.

We now pick up our story at 10:40 am local time on the flight deck of the USS Forrestal on July 29, 1967. Pilot Jim Bangert was in his F4-B cockpit preparing for the 1100 strike launch. His Brown Jersey plane captain had signaled the deck crews to bring over and attached the F-4B ground start cart necessary for Jim to start the two engines of his F-4B. His aircraft was equipped that day with two LAL-10 launchers, each with three 5” Zuni rocket launchers with a total of 24 rockets.

July 29, 1967 – Yankee Station at 10:40 AM – The Accident Initiation

On the morning of July 29^th, the USS Forrestal had plans to launch three separate strikes, one at 0700, one at 1100, and one at 1500. The strikes each consisted of a mix of aircraft, but we’ll focus here on the air-to-ground missions of the A-4s and F-4Bs. Knowing full well the danger of holding the 26-year-old AN-M65A1 1000 lb. bombs on the carrier’s “bomb dump” behind the main deck island, Captain Belling directed that all 26 weapons be expended on July 29^th. Ten of these bombs were loaded on 5 A-4s and safely departed the ship on the 0700 strike launch without incident. Ten more AN-M65A1s were scheduled to go out on the 1100 strike, and the remaining six on the 1500 strike. At 10:40 in the morning, the last six AN-M65A1s did not yet have their “tail fin kits” installed when they arrived from the ammunition ship Diamond Head, so these six were sent midmorning down to the hanger deck to have the fins fitted for the 1500 strike mission.

At 10:40 am, all of the planned 27 combat aircraft for the 1100 launch were in various states of preparation and readiness. Aircraft were prepositioned and spread among the two front catapults (Catapult #1 and Catapult #2) and the two waste catapults on the angled deck (Catapult #3 and Catapult #4). Usually, the first aircraft to be launched were the S-3 tankers, A-3 reconnaissance aircraft, the E-2 Hawkeye radar surveillance, and the vanguard helicopter that takes station astern of the carrier during launches in case a pilot ditches their plane. These aircraft were being jockeyed in forward Catapults 1 and 2. The main body of strike aircraft composed of A-4s and F-4Bs were spread across the aft of the Forrestal and were to be launched on the waste Catapults 3 and 4. Already fueled, the ground carts began to circulate amongst these strike aircraft to start their engines.

Jim Bangert was an F-4B pilot assigned to aircraft #110, his aircraft currently occupying the furthest aft and starboard (right) side of the flight deck. As parked, he was angled slightly to the left. Bangert’s F-4B would be using the new Zuni 5 rocket weapon system, and he had found out only moments earlier at his preflight briefing that his aircraft would be using the Zuni rocket system. Bangert was exceptionally safety conscious, and he served as his squadron’s armament safety officer. Bangert was uncomfortable with the deck Red Shirt arming crews plugging in the LAL-10 launcher power “pigtails” before the catapult. His crew assured him that this new procedure was “approved.” He knew the LAL-10 TER safety pin was his ultimate safety backup when he climbed into the cockpit, which gave him some comfort of safety.

Meanwhile, across the deck, A4 pilots Fred White, John McCain, and Dave Dollarhide were prepping their respective A-4 Skyhawk. A total of 5 A-4s on the left aft deck were equipped with two each of the AN-M65A1 1000 lb. bombs along with a 400-gallon JP-5 centerline fuel tank. Because these bombs were not the usual MK82/83/84 class weapon, they were attached to the A-4 using an older canvas strapping system instead of the typical MK80 series hard mount. After visually inspecting their payloads, all the A-4 pilots climbed into their cockpits using an 11 ft. detachable cockpit ladder. Once settled into their cockpits, the Brown Jersey plane captains armed their ejection seats and then removed the 11-foot cockpit ladders. Soon, the ground start cart will arrive, and they’ll all be on their way.

At 10:45 am, Weapon Loader Petty Officer 2nd Class James Wilson of VF-11 connects the LAL-10 launcher friction fit power pigtail and removes the TER safety pin on Jim Bangert’s F-4 prior to engine start. Bangert is already in the cockpit and knows nothing about the safety pin being removed. His F-4B, with 24 Zuni Rockets, is connected to one of Forrestal’s ground start carts. He starts his right and left engines per protocol and lets the engines spool for a few minutes before switching his aircraft to its two internal 400 Hz generators. It is now 10:51 am. The configuration of the Forrestal at this very moment is shown in Figure 1.

Before proceeding further, it is clear that Reference 1 mentioned in Part 1 of this article is amiss. Recall I quoted the following: “A Navy jet landing on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Forrestal experienced the un-commanded release of munitions that struck a fully-armed and fueled fighter on deck.”

The Forrestal was not configured at this moment in time to accept any landing aircraft, it’s logistically and physically impossible. This reference is completely debunked.

The moment of the accident initiation is at hand. At this exact time, one may wonder what is currently stationed on Forrestal’s flight and hanger decks. Fortunately, there is an exact USN accounting; let’s take a moment to review all the flammables on the flight deck.^[26]

There were 27 fully fueled and armed aircraft for the 1100 strike. These were armed with ten 1,000 lb. AN‑M65A1 bombs, eight 750 lb. AN‑M117 bombs, 64 MK82 500 lb. bombs, 144 5” Zuni rockets, each with a 125 lb. warhead, 24 Sidewinder and 23 Sparrow air-to-air missiles, and six Shrike missiles. All the aircraft on deck held a combined total of 40,000 gallons of JP-5 jet fuel. The “bomb dump” behind Forrestal’s island on the flight deck held weapons for the planned 1500 strike. These included 34 750 lb. AN-M117 bombs, 22 MK82 500 lb. bombs, two LAL-10 launchers with eight more Zuni rockets, and nine more Shrike missiles. Below deck, the hanger bay #1 contained an additional 53 tons of munitions, including six more of the AN-M65A1 bombs, 73 750 lb. AN-M117  bombs, 35 Mk 82 500 lb. bombs, 16 of the 300 lb. Mk81 bombs, four CBU-24B 830 lb. bombs, two Sidewinders, and two Sparrow air-to-air missiles.

At exactly 10:51:23 am on July 29, 1967, Pilot Jim Bangert, following normal preflight procedures, switched his aircraft from ground start power to his internal left and right aircraft generators by switching the two switches shown in Figure 7 in Part 1 of this article. Throwing these switches sent a power transient throughout the jet, including to the LAL-10 plug and its Zuni payload. Bangert felt a Zuni rocket launching which struck an opposing A-4 Skyhawk with Lt. Commander Fred White in the cockpit (see Figure 2). He testified later his F4-B master ARM was off, his right hand was on the two power switches above, and his left hand was on the throttles and not on the F4-B control column.

Streaking across the flight deck, the Zuni took the shoulder off a Brown Jersey across the deck, then struck Fred White’s external fuel tank, causing it to instantly explode and rupture. Shrapnel from the Zuni explosion penetrated two neighboring A-4 fuel tanks, spilling a total of 1200 gallons of burning JP5 on the deck. Furthermore, the jarring explosion from the Zuni knocked both of Fred White’s AN-M65A1 bombs attached to his aircraft to the deck. While they didn’t explode on contact because the arming spinner hadn’t been activated, they were sitting amidst 1200 gallons of burning JP-5 fuel. Within five seconds of the Zuni strike, queued by the explosion, the PLATS camera operator Petty Officer Third Class Vince Ignizio turned his camera aft and begins to film the unfolding disaster.

Fire on the Flight Deck Aft!

Immediately across the entire flight deck, heads turned and instincts kicked in. Get the fire out, grab hoses, foam hoses, extinguishers, anything. Help the wounded, of which there were plenty. Those closest to the fire recognized the dangers immediately. Away from the fire, plane directors and catapult operators immediately ceased operations and started evacuating pilots or moving aircraft forward and out of danger. Those wounded and on the deck cried for help, and sailors from all corners begin to converge. The fire must be stopped.

The Forrestal’s Repair 8 squadron was chiefly responsible for aircraft crash, recovery, and fire control. Their leader, Chief Petty Officer Gerald Farrier (Figure 3, inset), was considered the finest trained firefighter in the entire Atlantic fleet. If a fully fueled aircraft caught fire, Repair 8’s firefighting team was trained to quell JP-5 fuel fires within one to three minutes using a combination of foam and carbon dioxide (CO₂) fire suppressants. When Fred White’s fuel tank exploded, CPO Farrier grabbed a CO₂ fire extinguisher and dashed out to White’s burning A-4 within 30 seconds of the Zuni strike. Since the PLATS camera had now swiveled aft towards the fire, the entire accident scene was filmed within five seconds of the Zuni strike. Figure 3 shows the PLATS camera at 10:51:33 am, only twelve seconds after the Zuni. It shows CPO Farrier running and initiating the CO₂ extinguisher while his eight Repair 8 shipmates were seconds behind him, dragging foam hoses. Four nearby seamen were dragging a 2.5” saltwater fire hose, including Yellow Jersey Air Boss Aviation Boatswain Mate Dave Dickerson from Catapult 3.

Meanwhile, Brown Jersey plane captains tried desperately to get pilots out of their A-4s without having their 11-ft. cockpit exit ladders nearby. Lt. (j.g.) Dave Dollarhide jumps from his A-4 awkwardly and breaks his hip and elbow when he lands on his side. Flat on the burning flight deck with a broken hip and elbow, he is somehow dragged to safety by deck personnel. Next to him, Lt. Commander John McCain tightropes on his refueling probe and jumps to the deck in the middle of a burning JP-5, severely bruising his ribs and receiving multiple burns. He, too, escapes and heads to the sick bay to treat his injuries. Finding the sick bay overwhelmed, McCain runs to the hanger deck to help with firefighting and weapons disposal. Fred White is initially trapped but miraculously escapes with the help of his brave plane captain and Brown Jersey ground crew.

Now, under White’s A-4, CPO Farrier immediately noticed something was seriously wrong. He spots the two AN-M65A1 bombs on the deck in direct contact with the fire, both split, sizzling, and leaking deadly explosives. Though he tries desperately to quench the two bombs with CO₂, he knows it’s hopeless since these AN-M65A1 bombs were not fire-rated. Turning around, he desperately tries to waive away the rest of the Repair 8 and the other firefighters because detonation is imminent.

At 10:52:55 am, 94 seconds after the Zuni strike, the first of Fred White’s AN-M65A1 bomb explodes, instantly killing 28 sailors on deck, including the entirety of the Repair 8 firefighting team and CPO Farrier. The PLATS camera operator, Petty Officer Ignizio, records the catastrophic moment of detonation in Figure 4.

Aviation Boatswain Mate Dave Dickerson recounts the moment.

“I see the initial fire developing. I know the importance of getting a jump on the growing flames. I run aft to join up on a fire hose. Running on an angled path towards the starboard catwalk, I arrive at a saltwater fire station in the catwalk near the boat and aircraft crane just aft of the elevator. I helped break out the hoses and handing them up to the flight deck while the saltwater was charged.”

“On the flight deck, I climbed out of the starboard catwalk and join others manning a charged saltwater fire hose as it is advancing towards the fire. Then bam! The next thing I know, I’ve been blown backward along the deck by the first explosion. I jump back to my feet, and to my total surprise I was uninjured!” ^[30,31]

Dave Dickerson’s shipmates on the fire hose were all killed instantly.^[31] Getting up again, Dave charged back into the blazing inferno, grabbing yet another fire hose.

The initial blast creates a ten-foot diameter hole in the armored flight deck. Beneath the gaping hole were sleeping berths where 60 sailors died instantly in their beds. With all the nearby damaged aircraft gushing JP-5 fuel, thousands of gallons of burning JP-5 now flow below, causing massive fires below deck. At 10:53:01 am, just 9 seconds after the 1^st explosion, a second AN-M65A1 bomb explodes, again recorded by the PLATS cameraman PO Ignizio (see Figure 5).

The third explosion shatters most of the windows in the Forrestal’s island area called “PRI-FLY,” where the PLATS camera operator PO Ignizio worked. While everyone else in PRI-FLY was hunkered below the steel window frames, PO Ignizio stayed behind his camera and continued to record. Over the next four minutes, four additional AN-M65A1 bombs exploded. Chaos now reigns on the deck, with burning aircraft, ordinance, fuel, and debris flying everywhere. It’s 10:56 am and the desperate fire battle begins in earnest.

Captain John Belling (Figure 6) was just returning from his cabin when the fire started. Arriving at the bridge when the first explosions hit, he issued a series of critical orders. He reversed engines to slow the ship so that the deck fires were not fanned by 39 mph deck winds. He ordered condition “ZED” to close all watertight doors and to contain the fire in specific sections of the ship. While this did trap some sailors in burning spaces, it very likely saved the ship. He ordered deck crews by the bomb dump, on the flight deck, and on the hanger deck to throw overboard all ordinance and to push overboard as many burning aircraft as possible.

Non-commissioned sailors throughout the ship mobilized thousands of sailors to attack various aspects of the fire. Many of these brave sailors were not trained to fight fuel-fed fires, and their use of saltwater hoses frequently moved the burning fuel around instead of extinguishing it. But they learned fast and charged the maelstrom both above and below deck without regard for personal safety.

By 10:57 am, the overall situation was grave indeed. Thousands of gallons of JP-5 were pouring below decks in multiple flight deck holes (see Figure 7).

Meanwhile, below deck in damage control, Chief Engineering Officer Commander Mervin Rowland was dealing with several very serious issues. By 11:00 am, millions of gallons of seawater pumped below decks to fight fires cause the USS Forrestal to list significantly to port. Carriers are by nature top-heavy, and the ship rapidly approaches the point of capsizing, endangering the entire 5,400-man crew. Since this carrier is fuel-oil-powered instead of nuclear-powered, Captain Belling ordered Commander Mervin Rowland to pump all fuel oil to the port tanks. His quick execution of this order reduced the list and saved the ship from capsizing. Meanwhile, the USS Rupertus drew alongside and, in a feat of incredible seamanship, kept station with the moving USS Forrestal with only a few feet separating them while lending their fire hoses to the battle (Figure 8).

Commander Rowland also had two other catastrophic problems to contain. To prevent the JP-5 fuel lines from further contributing to the fire, he ordered the entire ship’s fuel system purged with inert CO₂ gas. Next, he realized the intense fire on the hanger deck was rapidly advancing toward the ship’s 750-gallon liquid oxygen (O₂) tank. This tank is used to fill the oxygen bottles of the ship’s aircraft complement, and if the fire reached it, it would act like an accelerant and cut the ship apart. Normally, a crew of six sailors would take control of this O₂ tank, but because of the intense fire and condition ZED, only Sailor Robert Clark was able to get to his general quarters station by the O₂ tank.

Commander Rowland ordered Sailor Clark to empty the tank overboard, but this contingency was never planned for in the design of the tank. Sailor Clark found a valve on the tank’s lower side. He scrounged up a 1” garden hose, hooked it up, and dragged the end of the hose to the edge of the hanger deck overboard. He then discharged the entire 750-gallon contents of the O₂ tank safely overboard, with the angry deck fire only 20 feet away from him!   

The final big problem Commander Rowland faces involves the Forrestal’s steering. The USS Forrestal was designed with redundant steering controls on the port and starboard aft end of the ship. Steering controls were normally relayed electronically from the bridge, but the intense fire on the hanger deck aft had cut off the port steering room from the rest of the ship. Three sailors were trapped in port steering, including Sailor James Blakis, who on that day had traded duties with his best friend, Sailor Robert Shelton. Robert was on the bridge recording commands from Captain Belling when he learned of his friend being trapped.

Commander Rowland knew the firefighters wouldn’t reach port steering in time to save the sailors there, but he had to have the controls for port steering transferred to the starboard steering room. Despite injuries and the intense heat, James Blakis and his crew successfully transferred the controls. At this point, Captain Belling allowed Robert Shelton to phone down to port steering to say goodbye to his friend James before the fires overwhelmed the compartment.

Despite overwhelming odds, the deck crews extinguished the topside fires in about 2.5 hours. This is in spite of multiple additional ordinance explosions, including a Shrike missile, multiple 20mm cannon rounds, and belts of 50 caliber machine gun bullets going off in the burning aircraft. Below decks, the fires were more persistent and stubborn, but after 17 hours, the last of the flames were extinguished.

At this point, 134 sailors had perished, and another 161 were severely injured. Only 28 of the fatalities were on deck, the rest were below in the sleeping and working berths beneath the flight deck. Of the 73 aircraft on board, 21 were utterly destroyed, and another 40 were damaged, many permanently. In 2024 dollars, damage to the Forrestal exceeded $644 million dollars, with another $537 million of destroyed aircraft and lost ordinance. The scale of the post-fire devastation is evident in Figure 9.

Sorting the Chaos – The Post-Accident Investigation

After quenching the fire, the USS Forrestal was initially ordered to Subic Bay in the Philippines. After being made seaworthy, the Forrestal was ordered to return to Norfolk for repair and refit. During the return voyage, an accident board chaired by Rear Admiral Forsyth Massey (Figure 10) was convened aboard the Forrestal.

During the long homeward voyage, Admiral Massey and his board interviewed nearly everyone on the flight deck and all the pilots, including Jim Bangert. Massey’s surviving aircraft evidence was non-existent, as Bangert’s F-4 and nearly all the A-4s were pushed overboard to quell the fire. Since the entirety of the Repair 8 firefighting crew was killed, he lacked much of the “hard evidence” an accident board would normally have. However, he did have the PLATS video data taken by PO Ignizio, and it turned out to be the key evidence of the root cause.

From the pilot and deck crew interviews, many testified seeing a bright flash from the fantail in the vicinity of Bangert’s F-4 #110. As Bangert had miraculously survived, he testified that he felt a Zuni launch the moment he switched over his F-4B from the cart to aircraft power. Looking at other F-4Bs on deck that had survived the fire, Massey ordered that a Zuni Rocket be launched out to sea from an F-4 to see what “safety interlocks” had to be overridden to cause a LAL‑10 paired with a Zuni launcher to “fire its weapon.”

Several of the accident board members also inquired whether the Zuni launch event could have been triggered by the on-board radar. So, Massey checked the Combat Information Center’s electronic records. He found that the AN‑SPS 43 UHF radar main beam was pointed forward and slightly to starboard. He also found that prior to the Zuni launch, an S-3 Sky Warrior aircraft was on Catapult 2, awaiting the launch command. As the aircraft hadn’t launched when the Zuni fired, the SPS-30 radar would have been pointing forward and in standby mode, awaiting the catapult trigger to turn on and measure the departure velocity. Since the SPS‑30 was pointed forward, neither of these radar’s main beams were pointed anywhere close to the location of Bangert’s parked F-4B on the rear starboard side of the ship.

There was never hard evidence presented with data that implicated either of the onboard radar systems with the actual initiation event. The fact that Bangert stated that the Zuni firing was tied precisely to the moment of switching from ground start to aircraft power ruled out this possibility.

In reviewing the PLATS video, Massey had a complete visual record of everything that happened 10 seconds after the Zuni launch because the PLATS operator PO Ignizio had bravely filmed the entire scene. What about the actual initiation event itself? While reviewing the PLATS footage as it focused on the soon-to-be-launched A-3 Sky Warrior, a weird flash appears forward of the A-3 in the video, as shown on the left side of Figure 11. (To see a 17-second film loop of this flash, go to https://youtu.be/0RiQUK89oug.)

Did the PLATS camera somehow capture the moment of initiation even though it was pointed forward and not aft? This is where Admiral Massey made a brilliant deduction. He remembered the interior of PRI-FLY, where the PLATS camera was located, had a curved Plexiglas housing. After having the housing repaired, he wondered if the PLATS camera looking forward had viewed a reflection of an event that occurred on the aft of the ship (see the right side of Figure 11).

To test his thesis, Massey conjured up an experiment on deck. He equipped a crew with a high-powered strobe flash unit and placed the crew at various positions on the aft of the ship. He had them “fire” the strobe while he was watching the PLATS cameras as it was pointed forward at Catapult 2 just as the day of the accident. When the deck crews went to the starboard side aft and positioned their strobe at the very position of Jim Bangert’s F4-B wing root (Figure 12), the flash appeared on the PLATS display exactly as in Figure 11. Not only had Massey proved his thesis, the PLATS system gave him the exact time of the event.

Accident Root Cause and Investigation Conclusions

1^st Conclusion

The initial flight deck fire on July 29, 1967, at 10:51:23 am local time was caused by F-4B Phantom Jet #110 piloted by Jim Bangert inadvertently firing a 5” Zuni rocket which struck an A-4 Skyhawk #416 piloted by Fred White. The A-4 was loaded with a 400-gal external fuel tank and two AN-65A1 1,000 lb. bombs. The bombs were dislodged from the A-4 and fell to the surface of the flight deck, which was immediately engulfed in flames from 1,200 gallons of spilled JP-5 fuel from three damaged A-4s.

The Zuni fired precisely when Jim Bangert switched from a ground start cart power to his aircraft generator power. The LAL-10 launcher connector was plugged in, and the TER safety pin was pulled. The accident board noted that LAL-10 pigtails frequently had loose or bent pins, and several post-accident inspections revealed shorted or malfunctioning pins on other LAL-10 launchers. While there were technically six interlocks to prevent the firing command from reaching the LAL-10 launcher, there turned out to be little protection for the LAL-10 power line to jump a voltage surge directly to the firing command wire. F-4B voltage surges down the LAL-10 pigtail during ground cart switchover were reproduced in the field and in the lab on other USN F-4Bs. This was confirmed post-accident, as Bangert’s F4-B was pushed overboard during the fire.

2^nd Conclusion

The initial flight deck fire could have been controlled within 2-3 minutes if the A-4 munitions were standard MK 81/82/83 bombs, which had fire ratings of a minimum of four minutes and up to ten minutes in direct fire contact. Firefighter Gerald Ferrier had a CO₂ extinguisher on the two AN-65A1 bombs within 40 seconds, as confirmed by the PLATS video. His team was pulling foam lines right behind him. However, the original deck fire catastrophically spread after the detonation of seven AN-M65A1 “thin-skinned” bombs. Three additional AN-M65A1s could have been blown overboard in those explosions, otherwise, those certainly would have exploded as well. The first explosion occurred 94 seconds after the Zuni fire started. The second detonation occurred at 103 seconds, and the remaining five explosions occurred within four minutes of the Zuni fire initiation. Note that firefighting was hampered because the entire firefighting Repair 8 squadron was killed in the first explosion.

3^rd Conclusion

The third series of findings surrounded the USS Forrestal’s firefighting equipment and capabilities. Containing the large fires above and below deck was hampered by a lack of firefighting experience with fuel-fed fires due primarily to the loss of critical Repair 8 personnel killed early in the fire. Trained firefighters know that chemical foam sprayed on top extinguishes fuel fires while water goes underneath burning fuel and spreads it. Much of the burning fuel spilled through the ten-foot deck hole caused by the first explosion and flowed through several lower decks, which burned for the next 16+ hours before being contained.

Despite a lack of formal firefighting training, many of Forrestal’s sailors pressed into service fearlessly battled fires and never retreated. Their heroic actions saved the ship from destruction. Furthermore, with all the additional water weight on the port side, Captain Belling’s orders to Commander Rowland to shift oil weight to starboard prevented Forrestal from capsizing.

4^th Conclusion

Captain Belling had the last statement to the accident board. His comment of record was as follows:

“The diagram shows that (a) massive effort to control the fire was under way and that the hoses from the starboard catwalk and forward were surrounding it. About one additional minute would have been required to bring enough hoses into action to affect the fire and they would have been ideally placed to contain it. I feel, therefore, that had the bomb not exploded, significant headway could have been made against the fire by about three minutes after its inception. However, I consider it utterly beyond the possibility that the fire could have been suppressed in ninety-four seconds by any group of men with the equipment available. We only needed three minutes. Just three (expletive) minutes and we could have controlled that fire….Yet (my) crew responded with consummate skill and bravery.”

All the primary deck explosions in the first five minutes were attributed to the AN-65A1 bombs. Even in the extended fire, not a single MK 83/84/85 on other aircraft detonated. They burned, they melted, but they didn’t catastrophically detonate in the giant blaze that followed the original explosions. Other Zunis and Shrikes missiles did explode, but the crew never backed down nor retreated in their duties.

At this point, a little perspective is important. During World War II, the US Navy at the Battle of Midway sank four Japanese carriers by striking them with dive bombers using a single 1000 lb. bomb each. One 1,000 lb. bombs struck the IJN carrier Akagi, three or four bombs struck IJN carrier Kaga, three struck IJN carrier Hiryu, and three struck IJN carrier Soryu.

The USS Forrestal survived the explosion and fire from no less than seven AN-65A1 1,000 lb. bomb explosions and multiple secondary explosions. In the midst of total disaster, Forrestal’s brave crew saved her from sinking.

Investigation Lessons Learned

Admiral Massey’s 7,500-page classified report was sent to Admiral Ephraim Holmes, Commander of the USN Atlantic Fleet, who reported to the USN Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Moore. Admiral Massey’s report essentially exonerated Captain Belling and the crew’s response to the fire, putting the blame squarely on US Navy Systems Command. In addition to sending the original AN-M65A1 bombs to Forrestal in the first place, Massey identified many technical and safety shortfalls of carrier operations with live ordinance and identified specific faults with the F4-B arming system and LAL-10 launcher subsystem. Massey’s report recommended a complete safety overhaul of weapons safety from design to implementation.

Admiral Ephraim Holmes disagreed with Massey’s report only in one area – he held Captain Belling personally responsible for the fire and issued him a career-ending reprimand. When Admiral Moore, the CNO, reviewed the report and Admiral Holmes’s dissent, he decided to rescind Captain Belling’s reprimand. However, Admiral Moore wanted one more look at the root cause. He brought in now-retired Rear Admiral James Russell, his former Vice Chief of Naval Operations, to independently re-review Massey’s report to confirm findings and follow any open leads.

Two months later, Admiral Russel returned to the CNO’s office to provide his “final verdict” of the root cause. Out of courtesy, Captain Belling was invited to attend the half-hour debrief. Russell pulled out of his pocket a TER safety pin with its red “Remove Before Flight” streamer attached and a separate brass multi‑contact slide switch. He stated that the underlying brass slide switch is what the TER pin disengaged. Russel stated that the switch design was flawed, and it regularly shorted out in bench tests, oftentimes regardless of whether or not the TER pin was fully engaged or removed. Ground tests proved beyond a doubt that a power surge could jump directly from the power pin to the firing pin during transients like engine start-up and power switch-over from ground power. “That’s what caused the fire.” Though exonerated by the CNO, Captain Belling never again commanded a ship.

So, how bad was the TER safety pin design? According to USN Systems Command, the “LAL-10 Launcher was ‘impossible’ to launch a weapon when all safety systems engaged and functional.”  Upon close inspection and reviewing many LAL-10 field units, multiple design deficiencies were uncovered: 1) the LAL-10 TER and shorting pin had to be fully screwed in to be properly seated. However, pins corroded in the salt air after multiple uses, preventing proper seating of pins and making the safety interlock unreliable; 2) the TER shorting device only needed to be 20% loose to potentially open a pathway from the power to firing pin, thereby effectively leaving the weapon system armed; 3) if the TER shorting device is “sprung” it never makes contact, which fails to “safe the weapon;” and 4) if the LAL10 mounting lugs are not fully seated, there is mechanical interference which prevents the TER pin from seating completely. This is why Russel states, “That’s what caused the fire.”

Permanent USN Safety Changes after the USS Forrestal Fire

In 1967, there were hundreds of documented USN fires, mostly minor, in vessels across the entire Navy. The USN decided that, in basic training, every sailor and officer would be taught how to prevent and fight chemical, paper, and fuel-fed fires. The US Navy’s Fire Fighting School was greatly expanded, and every recruit today gets fully certified fire training. The Fire Training School is named after Chief Petty Officer Gerald Farrier.

Over the years, every single US Aircraft carrier was retrofitted with a “Carrier Wash-down Firefighting System.” Basically, this is a giant chemical foam inverted sprinkler system that could wash an entire carrier deck in foam suppressant with the pressing of a button on the bridge in minutes. (See a three-minute demonstration of a wash-down system on a Royal Navy ship.)

Lastly, the US Navy established a brand-new program called insensitive munitions. The purpose of the program was to ensure a weapon carried on any ship would never go off, deploy, or explode unless it was supposed to. Safety interlocks were upgraded, EMI/EMC-related power transient suppression systems were added, and arming procedures were changed. While insensitive munitions did spawn far-reaching electromagnetic compatibility requirements, including hardening from RF interference, the root cause of the Forrestal accident was a power-switching event and not a radar induction event. Hence, my introductory referrals to References [1] and [2] in Part 1 blaming the shipboard search radar are clearly incorrect.

So, were the radars seriously examined as a possible cause of the USS Forrestal accident? Yes, that thread was explored, and preliminary (not final) findings stated the threat needed to be considered. But a deep dive into the problems with the F4-B power subsystem and the inadequacies of the LAL-10 launcher TER safety pin were clearly identified as the accident’s root cause. Contributing to the accident was the presence of ordinance that never should have been brought on board (AN-M65A1 bombs) and the procedural short-cuts to connect weapons connectors prior to arriving at the catapult.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the US Naval Heritage Command, the USS Forrestal Organization, Dr. Mike Nowak (USAF F-4 combat pilot), Aviation Boatswain Mate Dave Dickerson, and the multiple people who contributed to or reviewed this work.

I am especially grateful for Dickerson’s referral to Kenneth V. Killmeyer’s outstanding book Fire, Fire, Fire on the Flight Deck Aft; This Is Not a Drill, arguably the definitive word on the actions of thousands of sailors and their collective experiences in saving the USS Forrestal on July 29, 1967. This 831-page book shows there were thousands of stories as compelling as Dickerson’s own experience. I am so honored to have learned about these heroes whose stories I never knew but truly appreciated.

References

25. Courtesy USN and National Archives, 12 Aug 1967, Accession #: 330-CFD-DN-SC-04-09140
26. Killmeyer, Kenneth V., FIRE FIRE FIRE ON THE FLIGHT DECK AFT; THIS IS NOT A DRILL: Autherhouse Publishing 2018, pp 210‑211
27. From US Naval Institute Summary:
    https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/august/dissecting-carrier-disaster
28. National Geographic History Channel, Single Frame Grab from “Seconds from Disaster Aircraft Carrier Explosion,”  Original Broadcast 9-1-2021, Original from US Navy PLATS Camera
29. National Geographic History Channel, Single Frame Grab from “Seconds from Disaster Aircraft Carrier Explosion,”  Original Broadcast 9-1-2021, Original from US Navy PLATS Camera
30. Fire Fire Fire on the Flight Deck, this is No Drill, Kenneth Killmeyer, Artherhouse Publishing, 2018, ISBN 1546248595
31. Notes of personal phone interview of Survivor Dave Dickerson conducted by Dr. Brian Kent on 3 October 2024
32. National Geographic History Channel, Single Frame Grab from “Seconds from Disaster Aircraft Carrier Explosion,” Original Broadcast 9-1-2021, Original from US Navy PLATS Camera
33. Photo courtesy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_USS_Forrestal_fire#/media/File:RADM_John_Beling.jpg
34. National Geographic History Channel, Single Frame Grab from “Seconds from Disaster Aircraft Carrier Explosion,” Original Broadcast 9-1-2021
35. https://www.navsource.org/archives/02/025916.jpg
36. US Naval Heritage Command, Picture 1126644, USS Forrestal Fire
37. Courtesy US Naval Institute, Photo 451789jpg
38. National Geographic History Channel, Single Frame Grab from “Seconds from Disaster Aircraft Carrier Explosion,”  Original Broadcast 9-1-2021, Original PLATS Camera frame from USN
39. National Geographic History Channel, Single Frame Grab from “Seconds from Disaster Aircraft Carrier Explosion,” Original Broadcast 9-1-2021
40. Personal Photograph taken by Brian Fischer, used by permission, taken in Cincinnati, Ohio, August 2024